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A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR
IMPOSING STATUTORY UNDERWRITER
DUTIES ON RATING AGENCIES INVOLVED
IN THE STRUCTURING OF PRIVATE LABEL
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
The mortgage-backed security has evolved, in only thirty
years, from a virtually non-existent investment vehicle into such
a common investment alternative that today the market for
these securities is characterized as a "mature market."1 This
market has been traditionally dominated by government spon-
sored enterprises such as The Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation ("Fannie Mae") and The Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation ("Freddie Mac").2 Since 1982, however, the issuance
of private label mortgage-backed securities has grown dramati-
cally.3
A catalyst for the rapid growth of the private label mort-
gage-backed securities market has been the involvement of rat-
ing agencies.4 In fact, due to investor reliance on ratings and a
host of ratings-dependent rules used by financial regulators, 5
' See KENNETH LORE, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES-DEVELOPMENTS AND
TRENDS IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 2-1 (1995). "The mortgage-backed
security ('MBS') is an investment security representing an undivided interest in a
pool of loans secured by mortgages or trust deeds." Id. at 1-1.
Id. at 1-2 (describing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as "titans of the secondary
mortgage markets").
3 Id. at 1-17 ("Private label mortgage-backed securities are defined by the ab-
sence of any government guarantees."); Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit
Rating Industry, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. Q. REVIEW, June 22, 1994, 1994 WL
13019235, at *19 (stating private label issues securitize jumbo mortgages, commer-
cial mortgages, and other non-conforming mortgages not securitized by government
sponsored enterprises). The mortgage-backed securities market has grown rapidly
since 1989. Id. The years 1993 and 1994 were the "watershed years when institu-
tional investors, banks and mutual funds finally warmed to securitized commercial
mortgage pools and accepted them as legitimate fixed-income investments." Steve
Cocheo, Sea Change for Real Estate Finance?, A.B.A BANKING J., Apr. 1, 1995, at 48.
4 Tamara L. Adler & Robyn L. Ballard, Mortgage Pool Technology Tests New
Frontiers: Commercial and Multifamily Loans are the Latest Type of Collateral, Apr.
27, 1989, available in WESTLAW, 639 PLI/Corp 221; LORE, supra note 1, at 1-11.
5 See generally K. Susan Grafton, The Role of Ratings in the Federal Securities
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rating agencies have become essential market participants for
mortgage-backed securities.
As will be shown, the mortgage-backed securities rating
process has lead rating agencies to assume an active role in the
mortgage-backed securities arena, with rating agencies essen-
tially dictating the structure of these securities. Yet, despite this
active role, and the reliance placed upon the rating agencies by
financial regulators utilizing ratings-dependent rules, the rat-
ings industry has remained largely unregulated.6 Principally,
this has occurred because the traditional activity of the rating
agencies has generally fallen outside the scope of federal securi-
ties laws and because the current application of common law
principles has acted as a virtual shield against liability to inves-
tors relying on negligently assigned ratings
This Note, however, suggests that under current interpreta-
tion of federal securities laws, rating agencies involved in the
structuring of mortgage-backed securities may be deemed
"statutory underwriters" and therefore subject to regulation.
First, this Note will examine the role of the rating agencies in
the structuring of mortgage-backed securities, and the criticism
that market pressures may be impacting rating objectivity. This
Note will then discuss the traditional impediments to liability
imposed by the common law. Finally, this Note will provide a
conceptual framework for imposing statutory underwriter duties
on rating agencies involved in the structuring of mortgage-
backed securities.
BRIEF DEVELOPMENT OF THE RATING INDUSTRY
John Moody first started the securities rating industry in
1909 when he began rating United States railroad bonds.8 Over
the remainder of the twentieth century, various independent
ratings companies entered the market, and through subsequent
Laws, INSIGHTS, Aug. 1992, at 1, available in WESTLAW (discussing role and de-
velopment of ratings-dependent rules).Id.; Richard House, Ratings Trouble, CORPORATE FINANCE, Oct. 1995, at 245;
see also Mortgage-Backed Securities Still Baffling to Regulators, BEST'S REVIEW-
LIFE -- HEALTH INSURANCE EDITION, Apr. 1, 1995, at 11 (stating favorable regula-
tory treatment of commercial mortgage-backed securities will not last indefinitely).
' Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at *5. "Class action suits have been brought
against the rating agencies following major failures -- such as the Washington Pub-
lic Power Supply System default in 1983 and the Executive Life bankruptcy in 1991
- but the cases were dropped before verdicts were reached." Id.8 Id. at *2; House, supra note 6, at 245.
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mergers and acquisitions, the United States ratings industry ex-
panded and consolidated into four major players; Moody's Inves-
tors Service ("Moody's"), Standard & Poor's Corporation, Fitch
Investors Service, Inc. ("Fitch"), and Duff & Phelps, Inc..9 Today,
the rating agencies rate a variety of instruments in addition to
long term corporate bonds, including municipal bonds, commer-
cial paper, and asset backed securities."
Initially, the ratings industry was financed through the sale
of the agencies' various publications and investor materials, with
the ratings assigned independent of fees to the issuers." How-
ever, as the demand for rating services increased, the imposition
of charges to issuers became commonplace, with Standard &
Poor's first charging municipal bond issuers in 1968. Both
Fitch and Moody's began charging corporate issuers in 1970.'3
Currently, approximately eighty percent of Standard & Poor's
revenue is generated from issuer fees.'4
While the fees vary, the agencies typically charge the issuers
a spread on the principal rated and sometimes, other additional
fees."5 Although charging issuers could seemingly influence an
agency's objectivity when assigning ratings to client products,
the agencies insist that the overriding need to maintain investor
confidence through high quality, accurate ratings, provides a
sufficient deterrent against adjustments to ratings based upon
undue issuer influence. 6
9 Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at *3. "The four major ratings agencies face
additional competition from more specialized agencies." Id.
1 Id. at *2. Ratings have also been applied to other types of risks, including de-
rivative products companies, claims paying ability of insurance companies, and per-
formance risks of mortgage services. Id. Ratings agencies have also expanded their
reach overseas. Id.
" Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at *4. As the publications were easily copied,
the yield to rating agencies was insufficient to justify intensive coverage. Id.
' Id. at *4. The demand for ratings increased significantly with default of Penn
Central on $82 million of commercial paper in 1970. After the default, many issuers
actively sought credit ratings to reassure potentially nervous investors. Id. at *4-5.
13 Id.
14 Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at *5; cf. House, supra note 6, at 245 (stating
95 percent of Moody's and Standard & Poor's revenues come from issuer fees).
"Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at *5; House, supra note 6, at 245.
16 Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at *5. "If investors were to lose confidence in
an agency's ratings, issuers would no longer believe they could lower their funding
costs by obtaining its ratings." Id. The agency system "appears to have been effec-
tive, with no major scandals in the ratings industry" so far. Id.
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REGULATORY RELIANCE
The use of ratings-dependent rules in the federal securities
regulatory scheme began in the 1930s and has expanded to the
extent that virtually all financial regulators rely on some rat-
ings-dependent rules.17 As with most securities, issuers of mort-
gage-backed securities seek higher ratings in order to ease the
burden of complying with federal securities laws or to make the
instruments available to investors who would otherwise be pro-
hibited from trading the product. 8
While it is generally presumed that most mortgage-backed
securities are "securities," as defined by federal securities laws,
there is little case law directly addressing the issue. 9 Instead,
the attention has focused mostly upon how the various securities
laws and rules apply to mortgage-backed securities.0 Indeed,
Congress' adoption of the Secondary Mortgage Market En-
hancement Act of 1984,1 ("SMMEA"), and various actions by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, ("SEC"), such as the
promulgation of Rule 3a-7,22 seem to support the presumption
that mortgage-backed securities are "securities" within the
meaning of federal securities laws.
'7 Id. at *6 ("The reliance on ratings extends to virtually all financial regulators,
including the public authorities that oversee banks, thrifts, insurance companies,
securities firms, capital markets, mutual funds, and private pensions."); Grafton,
supra note 5, at 1.
18 Grafton, supra note 5, at 1.
LORE, supra note 1, at 4-11. "Virtually no case law or administrative decisions
exist that address the narrow question of whether mortgage-backed certificates are
securities." Id.; see also Mary Margaret Kuck, Mortgage-Backed Securities And Con-
sumer Related Receivables: A Lesson From The Past With An Eye Toward The Fu-
ture, 50 U. PITr. L. REV. 227 (1988) (discussing interpretation of mortgage-backed
securities as "securities" under the Glass-Steagall Act).
20 LORE, supra note 1, at 4-10. Because it is generally assumed that mortgage-
backed securities are "securities" under the law, most authorities are concerned
with whether they are exempt from the registration provisions of the 1933 Act. Id.
at 4-11.
21 Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98
Stat. 1689 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. & 15 U.S.C. (1994)). For
a general discussion of SMMEA provision, see Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J.
Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues, and New Frontiers, 69 TEx
L. REV. 1369, 1385-88 (1991).
"Exclusion From the Definition of Investment Company for Structured Fi-
nance, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,248 (1992). The rule adopted by the SEC excludes issuers
that pool income-producing assets and issue securities backed by those assets from
the definition of "investment company" under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Id.
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Easier registration under the 1933 Securities Act23 is among
the preferences that the federal securities regulatory scheme
confers upon higher rated issues. The 1933 Act requires most
non-exempt mortgage-backed securities to use Form S-11 when
registering.' In contrast, an investment grade asset-backed se-
curity, that is an asset-backed security rated in one of the four
highest rating categories by at least one Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organization ("NRSRO), 25 may use Form S-
3,26 a shortened form which simplifies the registration process,
thus reducing the cost of compliance.27 Furthermore, issues fit-
ting the definition of a mortgage-related security28 may qualify
for shelf registration."
Similarly, under Rule 3a-7 of the Investment Company Act
of 1940, the SEC has excluded certain structured financings from
the definition of the term "investment company."" To qualify for
the Rule 3a-7 exemption, the security must be rated in one of the
four highest rating categories by at least one NRSRO.3" In
promulgating this rule, the Commission recognized that "[tihe
involvement of the rating agencies represents one of the most
significant attributes of the structured finance market ... [and
that the] ratings appear to have been a major factor in investor
acceptance of structured financings."32
23See LORE, supra note 1, at 4-27; Grafton, supra note 5, at 1.
24 LORE, supra note 1, at 4-30 ("Registered offerings of mortgage-backed pass-
through certificates and mortgage-backed bonds frequently use [Form S-11].").
2' Most ratings-dependent rules require a rating by a NRSRO. For a general
discussion of NRSRO designation and associated problems, see Cantor & Packer,
supra note 3.
26 See LORE, supra note 1, at 4-31; Grafton, supra note 5, at 1.
27 See LORE, supra note 1, at 4-31; Grafton, supra note 5, at 1.
2 See LORE, supra note 1, at 4-32 to 4-33. The precise definition of 'mortgage-
related security' as used in this context has never been determined, however, it
seems certain that the term includes those securities that qualify as mortgage-
related securities as defined in the ratings-dependent definition under SMMEA. Id.;
see also infra notes 35-38 (discussing mortgage-related securities with respect to
SMMEA).
For a general discussion of the use and benefits of shelf registration for mort-
gage-backed securities, see LORE, supra note 1, at 4-32 to 4-37.
:" 57 Fed. Reg. 56,248 n. 37 (1992). The rule was intended to remove some of the
barriers to the use of structured financings. Id. at 56,249. It "excludes from the
definition of investment company any issuer who is engaged in the business of ac-
quiring and holding eligible assets ... and who does not issue redeemable securities."
Id. I 1 Id. at 56,251 n. 41. Paragraph (a) (2) of the rule sets forth this requirement
and the rating must exist at the time of initial sale of the security. Id.
-2 Id. at 56,252. "The rating requirement is incorporated in the rule as a means
1996]
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Perhaps the adoption of SMMEA in 1984 created the most
significant ratings-dependent rule.3 Relying on ratings, Con-
gress amended Section 3(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act by requir-
ing a "mortgage related security" to be "rated in one of the two
highest rating categories by at least one NRSRO."' The stated
purpose of SMMEA was to "encourage the 'broadening of the
market for mortgage-backed securities by encouraging more ex-
tensive involvement of the private sector .... " " Towards that
end, SMMEA preempts certain state legal investment and blue
sky laws so as to permit state regulated institutions, such as
pension funds, to invest in mortgage related securities.36 Simi-
larly, the Act permits national banks, federal credit unions, and
federal savings and loan associations to participate in private is-
sue mortgage-backed securitization.3 7 Thus, to the extent that a
structuring relies on SMMEA provisions for mortgage related se-
curities, the rating agencies become essential participants to the
transaction.
THE ROLE OF THE RATING AGENCIES IN STRUCTURING MORTGAGE-
BACKED SECURITIES
The development of ratings standards and the general avail-
ability of ratings have facilitated the growth of the mortgage-
backed securities market by making the securities more accept-
able to investors and by enhancing the liquidity of the invest-
ment.38 Furthermore, several ratings-dependent rules have ren-
dered the rating agencies essential players in the issuance of
many mortgage-backed securities.39
of distinguishing structured financing from registered investment companies." Id.
3 See Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at *8. "In addition to essentially creating
the nonagency mortgage-backed securities market, ... [the Act] established a new
regulatory cutoff rating." Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78c (a)(41) (1994).
Bronislaw E. Grala & A. Richard Susko, Considerations Respecting the In-
vestment by Employee Pension Benefit Plans Subject to ERISA and Government
Plans in Asset-Backed Securities, May 13-14, 1991, available in WESTLAW, 310
PLIITax 325 (quoting Senate Report No. 98-293).
36 15 U.S.C. § 77r-l(a) (1994). SMMEA permits the states to opt out of the pre-
emption provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 77r-1(c) (1994). Several states have opted out com-
pletely, and others have opted out of specific portions dealing with investments by
insurance companies. See LORE, supra note 1, at 4-101 (listing States that have
overridden federal pre-emption).
37 12 U.S.C. § 24 (7) (1994); 12 U.S.C. § 1757 (15)(B) (1994).
3 LORE, supra note 1, at 9-1.
" See generally Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, 98 Stat.
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Nevertheless, notwithstanding the reliance by both investors
and financial regulators, the methods used by the various rating
agencies to rate mortgage-backed securities differ. ° The differ-
ences in rating methodology are not, however, evident in the
ratings themselves, because issuers structure their securities to
meet the desired rating requirements of the particular rating
agency hired, with often only one agency retained to assign the
rating.4 Notably, this practice has led to the direct involvement
of the rating agencies in the structuring of mortgage-backed se-
curities, as the issuers have consulted them in order to deter-
mine how to structure the mortgage-backed security to receive
the desired rating." The active role assumed by the rating
agencies in the structuring of mortgage-backed securities, and
the fact that rating methods differ, leads one to wonder whether
any particular rating method is superior, or alternatively, inade-
quate to protect investor needs when compared with the other
rating methods.43 Indeed, the answer may undermine the entire
premise of regulatory reliance on the rating agencies-that in-
vestor needs are sufficiently protected by the attainment of a
particular rating."
Moody's has recognized that its own role in the rating of
mortgage-backed securities differs from the traditional role of
the agency in rating corporate debt issues.4" Moody's states that
its analysis of corporate debt issues is based upon the input of
1689 (1984) (requiring securities to be rated in one of two highest ratings category
by at least one NRSRO).
4' LORE, supra note 1, at 9-3; see also Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at *10
(noting SEC does not require uniform rating standard).
41 Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at *19; Abby Schultz, S & P Faces Criticism in
the Mortgage Area, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1994, at A7A ("The lower support levels
aren't evident to most investors, who often don't know exactly how a rating is ar-
rived at."). But see Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at 18 (noting issuers sometimes
obtain multiple ratings if they receive mixed or substandard ratings).
4 Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at *19; House, supra note 6, at 245.
43 Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at *19 ("Market observers have expressed
concern that competitive pressures have led agencies to compete on ratings criteria,
potentially undermining the reliability of the ratings.").
" See NAIC Cites Limited Role of Rating Agencies, THE INSURANCE REGULATOR,
Apr. 10, 1995, at 3. "Reliance on an NRSRO credit rating as a trigger for more leni-
ent regulatory treatment may inadvertently mask critical distinctions about which
risk is most relevant for financial solvency monitoring." Id. (quoting Report of the
Securities Valuation Office of the National Association of Insurance Commission-
ers).
,, See Moody's Investors Service, Rating Structured Finance, reprinted in, LORE,
supra note 1, at App. 9-1, 9-2 [hereinafter Rating Structured Finance].
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data that cannot be substantially altered in the short term for
that particular debt issue, such as the present financial condi-
tion and performance of a company.46 Thus, with corporate debt
issues, the agency's role is a passive one.
In contrast, with mortgage-backed securities the starting
point is typically the desired rating, with the security then struc-
tured to conform to that rating.47 Moody's admits that "in this
type of environment, [the agency] cannot simply react to input,
but must take a more active role in these transactions, repre-
senting the interests of the investors .... In assigning its rating,
Moody's [works] with the issuer, attorneys, investment bankers
and other participants involved in the transaction, in most cases
from the very early stages of the transaction."4" Moody's further
characterizes its role as "an advocate for the investor."49 The
question then becomes whether Moody's, with its level of in-
volvement in the structuring of mortgage-backed securities and
its own characterization of itself as an advocate for the investor,
has actually assumed a duty to the investor.
While a comprehensive discussion of the mechanics of rating
mortgage-backed securities by Moody's and the other agencies is
beyond the scope of this paper, some general observations can be
made." In general, rating procedures include a review of all as-
pects of the transaction including underwriting criteria, servic-
ing procedures, and legal implications." The rating analysis
generally focuses on two primary credit risks; the risk of non- or
partial payment and the risk of late payment, both of which im-
pact an investor's expected return." Moody's asserts that it
"attempts to make sure that the structure, the legal risks, and
the credit risks result in a composite risk level to the investor
46 Id. at App. 9-2.
47 Id.
0 Id. at App. 9-2 to App. 9-3.
49 Id. at App. 9-3 (emphasis added).
'0 For a more detailed analysis of the rating process, see Amy K Rhodes, The
Role Of The SEC In The Regulation Of The Ratings Agencies: Well-Placed Reliance
Or Free-Market Interference?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 293, 309-316 (1996).
" See generally Adler & Ballard, supra note 4 (describing approaches used for
rating large pools of commercial mortgages); LORE, supra note 1, at 9-1 to 9-73
(discussing various rating methods); Rhodes, supra note 50 (explaining rating sys-
tems); Ron J. Wechsler, Rating Single-Borrower Commercial Mortgage Transac-
tions, Nov.-Dec. 1994, available in WESTLAW, 704 PLI/comm 25 (describing Fitch's
rating method).
52 See LORE, supra note 1, at 9-3.
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which is consistent with the rating requested," however, the
precise definition of a composite risk level is unclear." What is
clear, on the other hand, is that perhaps the greatest risk inher-
ent in mortgage-backed securities, the risk of prepayment, is not
considered in the rating analysis."
To further complicate matters, highly volatile securities
have been created by stripping the entity into various principle-
only, interest-only, and residual pieces." Although the holders of
interest-only strips risk the extinction of their investment upon
prepayment, the security may still receive an AAA rating." The
sensitivity to market risks of certain mortgage-backed securities
products raises questions as to the value of the current rating
analysis and leads one to wonder whether the assignment of any
rating at all to these products is inherently misleading."
Indeed, the SEC has recognized the potentially misleading
nature of assigning credit ratings to interest-only ("1O") and
principle-only ("PO") securities.58 In the original proposed ver-
sion of Rule 3a-7, the SEC excluded IO's and PO's from the defi-
nition of fixed income securities, effectively precluding the sale of
these securities to the general public by any seller relying on the
rule." In the SEC's request for comment on the appropriateness
of the restriction, the SEC noted that, despite their extreme
volatility, IO's and PO's could still receive high credit ratings be-
53 Rating Structured Finance, supra note 45, at App. 9-3 (emphasis added); see
also Laura Jereski, Alice in Mortgageland. (Wall Street Brokers Using Mortgage.
Backed Securities in Complex Ways), FORBES, Mar. 1, 1993, at 46 [hereinafter Alice
in Mortgageland] ("Where there is complexity there can be hidden risk, and struc-
tured mortgage-backed securities are so complex it sometimes takes a mathemati-
cian to explain them.").
5' See Exclusion From The Definition Of Investment Company For Certain
Structured Financings, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,980, 23,982 n.28 (1992) ("A rating does not
address market risks to investors that may result from changes in interest rate
levels or from prepayments on the assets in the underlying pool."); LORE, supra note
1, at 9-70.
" See generally Laura Jereski, Warning: No Easy Read. (Mortgaged-Backed Se-
curities are Governed by Complex Rules), FORBES, Mar. 1, 1993, at 46 (discussing
complexity and volatility of mortgage-backed securities strips).
a See Alice in Mortgageland, supra note 53, at 46. "Wall Street has taken a tri-
ple-A product and injected market risk into it. People don't understand that at all."
Id. (quoting Robert Phelan, director of market risk products at Fitch Investors
Service).
"7 LORE, supra note 1, at 9-71.
5 See 57 Fed. Reg. 23,980, at 23,986 (1992).
59 Id.
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cause prepayment risks are not addressed by credit ratings."
Fearing that the unsophisticated investor may be misled, the
SEC stated that "[u]nsophisticated investors ... may not appreci-
ate the risks associated with 10 and PO securities, and sales of
these instruments to such investors may raise suitability con-
cerns."1 Nevertheless, the SEC, responding to commenters who
opposed the restriction, subsequently included IO's and PO's in
the final definition of fixed income securities.'2
Examining some of the differences in the rating methods
may also highlight the appropriateness of relying on the rating
agencies. For example, while Moody's assigns a quality rating to
each loan when analyzing a commercial mortgage pool, Standard
& Poor's utilizes an actuarial model based upon aggregate pool
statistics.63 The use of actuarial models in the analysis of com-
mercial mortgage pools has been criticized because of the lack of
homogeneity between commercial mortgages.' As opposed to
analyzing residential mortgage pools which are very homogene-
ous and extremely predictable, at least one commentator has ob-
served that the actuarial approach cannot be applied to com-
mercial mortgage pools with "any level of confidence," because
commercial mortgages are too complex to "permit blanket as-
sumptions about their performance." 5
Similarly, the rating agencies have been generally criticized
for their own reliance on legal opinions when assessing credit
risks.66 The concern is that although a rating has been assigned
in reliance on a legal opinion, investors relying on the rating it-
self may not understand that all risks have not been eliminated
60 Id.
61 Id.
'2See SEC Structured Finance Regulation Raises Opponents, MORTGAGE-
BACKED SECURITIES LETTER, Aug. 10, 1992, 1992 WL 2747064. The Public Securi-
ties Association stated that "[u]ndoubtedly, IOs and POs can have considerable price
volatility .... However, we question the need to prohibit outright the sale of those
securities to individuals and to severely restrict the number of institutions that can
purchase them." Id.
" See Adler & Ballard, supra note 4 (detailing rating agency methods of assess-
ing mortgage-backed securities).
See Lloyd Lynford, Too Much, Too Soon: Money is Rushing Blindly Back into
Commercial Real Estate, BARRON'S, July 4, 1994, at 40.
"Id.
"See The Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of the As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50
BUS. LAW. 527,536 (1995).
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despite the existence of the legal opinion."7
In 1983, Moody's distinguished between "reasoned" opinions
and "unqualified" or "unequivocal" opinions and asserted that an
unqualified opinion equates with all risks being "substantially
eliminated."60  In studying the issues, the Tribar Opinion Com-
mittee, a professional group, 9  severely criticized Moody's
"reasoned" versus "unqualified" dichotomy stating:
[T]here is no basis for the proposition that an unquali-
fied/"unequivocal" opinion, even in clean (as opposed to rea-
soned) form, means that all risks have been substantially elimi-
nated. A lawyer is not an insurer or a guarantor of opinions. A
lawyer is not liable for the "true state of the law," as long as the
opinion is based on the reasonable exercise of informed judg-
ment. Moreover, all lawyers understand that the law is not
changed by whether a lawyer's opinion is expressed as unquali-
fied.70
The active role that the rating agencies have assumed in the
structuring of mortgage-backed securities, coupled with the use
of rating-dependent rules, has lead to a concern that rating
agency objectivity may be compromised. Indeed, this fear grows
more acute as the competition for market share intensifies.7'
THE RATINGS MARKET DRIvING LOOSER STANDARDS
In recent years, many commentators have expressed the
concern that the competition in the ratings industry may be
leading to lower ratings standards . 2 This concern is particularly
7 rId.
" See The Tribar Opinion Committee, Opinions in the Bankruptcy Context: Rat-
ing Agency, Structured Financing, and Chapter 11 Transactions, 46 BuS. LAW. 717,
734 (1991) (citing Moody's Approach to Rating Bank-Supported Debt Securities,
MOODY'S BOND SURvEY, Jan. 3, 1983, at 3979).
c9 Id.
70 Id. at 735 (citations omitted).
71 See Schultz, supra note 41, at A7A (remarking that rating agencies are com-
peting for "lucrative fees ... receive[d] when they issue ratings of [mortgage-backed]
securities.").
72See Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at *19 (noting specifically the particularly
high competition in the ratings of mortgage-backed securities); House, supra note 6,
at 245 (stating "some agencies have moved from a traditional arm's length role as
judges of credit quality to practically helping to initiate securitization transac-
tions"); see also Grafton, supra note 5, at 6 (citing SEC Commissioner's remarks
that rating agencies should be subject to formal regulation); cf Schultz, supra note
41, at A7A (recognizing that some investors prefer competition to previous near mo-
nopolies of Moody's and Standard & Poor's).
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acute in the mortgage-backed securities arena because of the
pivotal role that the rating agencies play in structuring these se-
curities, due in part to regulatory reliance, and because of the
enormous potential market available for mortgage-backed secu-
rities ratings.73 Indeed, there is approximately two trillion dol-
lars of outstanding mortgage and asset-backed financing in the
United States today.74
Perhaps the greatest criticism of the rating agencies' role in
the structuring of mortgage-backed securities is generally re-
lated to the agencies' adjustments to credit enhancement re-
quirements." Nearly all mortgage-backed securities require
some form of credit enhancement such as bank letters of credit,
guarantees, or senior/subordinate financing. 6 Since all forms of
credit enhancement are costly and potentially reduce the profit-
ability of the deal to the issuer, issuers often seek those rating
agencies with the most lenient standards with respect to credit
enhancement.77 Upon examination of the development of mort-
gage-backed securities rating standards, there appears to be
some correlation between less stringent credit enhancement re-
quirements and a greater rating agency market share.
Initially, Standard & Poor's was the only agency rating
mortgage-backed securities, thus Standard & Poor's credit en-
hancement requirements set the industry standard.78 However,
in 1986, Moody's entered the market with different ratings cri-
7 See House, supra note 6, at 245; Schultz, supra note 41, at A7A.
' David S. Schaefer, Comment: A Jump-Start for the Mortgage-Backed Market?,
AM. BANKER, Oct. 24, 1995, at 38 (stating that outstanding commercial mortgage
loans are in substantial excess of $1 trillion and only two per cent have been securi-
tized).
7' See Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at *19 (observing that rating agencies
disagree on necessary criteria for establishing the amount of credit enhancement
required for specific ratings); see also Schultz, supra note 41, at A7A (reporting
Standard & Poor's adjustment of ratings criteria which resulted in 30% reduction of
requisite credit report).
76 See Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at *19 (stating that mortgage-backed se-
curity structures need to maintain highly-rated issues due to investor concern about
quality of collateral as well as investor unfamiliarity with overall structure of the
securities); Schultz, supra note 41, at A7A (observing that investors want protection
against foreclosure of mortgages).
7" See Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at *19 ("[Ilssuers prefer structures that
achieve a given rating with the smallest enhancements and choose rating agencies
with the most lenient credit enhancement requirements, provided the agencies'
ratings carry sufficient weight in the capital market.").
78 Id.
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teria.79 Although Moody's requirements were stricter in some re-
spects, Moody's credit enhancement standards were lower than
Standard & Poor's for certain types of mortgage pools.8" As a re-
sult, Moody's gained market share for those types of issues with
lower credit enhancement standards.8
In 1990, Fitch developed a model for evaluating mortgage-
backed securities that resulted in a further reduction of credit
enhancement requirements, by as much as fifty percent com-
pared to Standard & Poor's or Moody's." Currently, Fitch domi-
nates the mortgage-backed securities ratings market with over a
seventy percent market share."3
Under intense criticism from the financial industry, Stan-
dard & Poor's, in December 1993, lowered its credit enhance-
ment requirements by thirty percent and has since seen a sub-
stantial increase in market share.' Critics have charged that
both Standard & Poor's and Fitch's relatively lower credit en-
hancement standards are driven purely by a desire to increase
market share.85 Indeed, Duff & Phelps, which maintains that its
standards are more realistic, enjoys the smallest market share
for mortgage-backed securities ratings.86
On the other hand, Moody's has been criticized for assigning
unsolicited ratings.87 Unsolicited ratings tend to be substantially
lower than solicited ratings, because unsolicited ratings are gen-
erally based only upon available public information where as so-
licited ratings are based upon information obtained directly from
issuers.88 In 1987 and 1988, Moody's assigned lower unsolicited
ratings that caused yields to rise and ultimately lead some issu-
70 Id.
8 Id. (listing shorter term, negative amortization, and convertible, adjustable
rate mortgages as those structures requiring less stringent credit enhancement by
Moody's).
81 Id.
82Id.; House, supra note 6, at 245.
"'See House, supra note 6, at 245.
Id.; Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at 19; Schultz, supra note 41, at A7A.
See House, supra note 6, at 245; see also Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at 20
(noting two possible reasons for Standard & Poor's increase in market share-either
issuers are moving from Moody's to Standard & Poor's or there is a growth in issu-
ance by firms that always used Standard & Poor's).
£ See House, supra note 6, at 245.
See Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at 6 (observing that in 1987 & 1988,
Moody's used unsolicited votings for those mortgages which received stricter rating
criteria than Standard & Poor's).
'3 See Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at 6.
1996]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ers to change their mortgage-backed security structures and hire
Moody's. 9 The perception is that Moody's lower unsolicited rat-
ings are coercive to those issuers who choose not to hire
Moody's.90 Nevertheless, proponents of unsolicited ratings claim
that these ratings provide an important check against issuers
using solely those agencies with more lenient standards.91
Clearly, issuers are motivated to use those rating agencies
that offer the most favorable treatment, and various actions and
adjustments to rating standards have had some impact on mar-
ket share. To what extent the desire to increase market share
has impacted the agencies' actions, one can only speculate. To be
sure, reductions in credit enhancement requirements may be
merely the result of a better understanding of the risks and
complexities of mortgage-backed securities structures.92 None-
theless, the rating agencies remain the only major market par-
ticipants that are not subject to regulation and, as we will see,
under the current state of the law, the agencies freely operate
with little threat of liability.
TRADITIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO IMPOSING LIABILITY ON THE
RATING AGENCIES
While the actual standard of care imposed on the rating
agencies is somewhat unclear, some commentators have sug-
gested that liability depends upon a distinction between ordinary
negligence and recklessness based on general tort law principles
and First Amendment grounds.9" This reasoning and the prob-
lems plaintiffs confront when attempting to impose liability on
8' Id. at 20; House, supra note 6, at 245.
® See Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at 6; House, supra note 6, at 245
("Unsolicited ratings are tantamount to blackmail.") (quoting Paul Taylor, managing
director of Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Company in Europe).
91 See House, supra note 6, at 245; Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at 6.
See Cantor & Packer, supra note 3, at 20 ("Analysts and agencies note that
[the decline in credit enhancement levels] in part reflects a progression along the
learning curve....").
93 See, e.g., Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Comment, An Examination of the Current
Status of Rating Agencies and Proposals for Limited Oversight of Such Agencies, 30
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 579, 609 (1993) (discussing potential problems if rating agency
standard of care is increased from reckless to negligent); Gregory Husisian, Note,
What Standard of Care Should Govern the World's Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis
of Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 413-14 (1990) (employing
both economic and First Amendment analysis to determine rating agencies' stan-
dard of care).
[Vol. 70:779
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
the rating agencies are illustrated by First Equity Corp. v. Stan-
dard & Poor's Corp.94
In First Equity, Standard & Poor's was sued because of fac-
tual errors contained in Corporation Records, one of Standard &
Poor's investor publications.95 First Equity, claiming losses in
reliance of the errors, brought an action alleging both negligent
misrepresentation and fraud against Standard & Poor's." On a
motion to dismiss, Judge Goeteel of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of
Standard & Poor's on the negligent misrepresentation claim.
Judge Goettel, applying the Jaillet97 rule, stated:
It is widely recognized that in the absence of a contract,
fiduciary relationship, or intent to cause injury, a news-
paper publisher is not liable to a member of the public for
a non-defamatory negligent misstatement of an item of
news, 'unless he williflly ... circulates it knowing it to be
false, and it is calculated to and does ... result in injury to
another person.'
Judge Goettel expressed two reasons for the rule. First, per-
fection in the publishing business is impossible to attain.99 Sec-
ond, allowing the plaintiff to prevail would expose Standard &
Poor's to "the spectre of unlimited liability.""0
On the fraud claim, the plaintiff argued that the applicable
law allowed scienter to be established without proving actual
knowledge or intent to harm but instead by merely proving what
the defendant and the court characterized as negligent misrepre-
sentation.' Judge Goettel stated that, while in some circum-
stances a fraud claim may be based upon negligent misrepresen-
tation, proof of mere negligence is insufficient when the
defendant is a newspaper publisher or other party "in a compa-
rable position."0 2 To hold otherwise "would severely restrict the
ideas they distribute." 3
9 670 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1989).
"' Id. at 116.
13 Id.
17 Jaillet v. Cashman, 189 N.Y.S. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1921), affd., 194 N.Y.S. 947
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1922), affd mem., 139 N.E. 714 (1923).9; First Equity, 670 F. Supp. at 117 (citations omitted).
83 Id.
'co Id.
'o' Id. at 118-19 (discussing New York and Florida law).
102 First Equity, 670 F. Supp. at 119.
1 Id. (quoting Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1057 (Fla. 1977)).
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In a subsequent hearing on the fraud claim in front of Judge
Mukaseyj summary judgment was granted in favor of Stan-
dard & Poor's.' ° Basing the decision on constitutional grounds,'
Judge Mukasey applied the New York Times v. Sullivan'° stan-
dard which interprets the First Amendment as requiring a
showing of "actual malice" to hold a newspaper liable for its
publication. To show "actual malice," the plaintiff must prove:
"Standard & Poor's published the description with actual knowl-
edge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.
To show reckless disregard, '[t]here must be sufficient evidence
to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.' """o
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit agreed with Judge Goettel's original reasoning, dis-
posed of the case on tort law grounds, and declined to address
the constitutional issue.' The court found support for the Jail-
let rule by analogizing it to accountants liability for negligent
misrepresentation and by refusing to expand Standard & Poor's
liability "to a potentially 'indeterminate class of persons who,
presently or in the future, might ... rel[y]' ... on ... negligently
inaccurate [information]." 1° The court stated that Corporation
Records is "often only the starting point for research rather than
the finish line.""' And as such, users of Corporation Records:
can easily protect themselves from misstatements or inaccura-
cies by examination of the original documents or federally re-
quired prospectuses. In such circumstances, we believe that the
user is in the best position to weigh the danger of inaccuracy
and potential loss arising from a particular use of a summary
against the cost of verifying the summary by examination of the
104 First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 690 F. Supp. 256
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1989).
105 Id. at 256.
106 Apparently, there was a dispute over the scope of Judge Goetell's prior fraud
ruling, thus Judge Mukasey avoided the controversy by ruling on constitutional
grounds. First Equity, 690 F. Supp. at 258-59.
107 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
100 Id. at 259 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968))
(emphasis added).
100 First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 176 (2d
Cir. 1989).
"0 Id. at 179 (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441,
446 (N.Y. 1931)).
m" Id. at 180.
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original documents or prospectus .... That being the case, the
user should bear the risk of failing to verify the accuracy of a
summary in the absence of proof of a knowing misstatement.
112
Notably, the court recognized that while Jaillet is generally
used in the context of newspaper liability, the Jaillet defendant
was actually a provider of a stock ticker service and the Jaillet
court had "merely analogized stock tickers to newspapers with-
out equating them."1 The court stated that it was not convinced
that Standard & Poor's situation more closely resembled that of
a newspaper than of an accountant, however, the Jaillet rule
was applicable nonetheless."'
Thus, when attempting to apply common law remedies,
plaintiffs face a significant hurdle in imposing liability on the
rating agencies, even if the rating agency is negligent. Indeed,
the plaintiffs burden is so high that regardless of whether the
courts apply common law tort principles or constitutional prin-
ciples, the rating agencies are, in essence, effectively shielded
from all liability and free to impose any rating standards they
wish.
A BASIS FOR IMPOSING STATUTORY UNDERWRITER DUTIES ON THE
RATING AGENCIES
Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act imposes liability on a
series of parties for misstatements or omissions of material facts
made in connection with a registration statement."" Among
those parties who are potentially liable under Section 11 are un-
derwriters. At common law, and as generally understood in the
securities industry, an underwriter was any person that pur-
chases from an issuer with a plan to distribute the security."6
The 1933 Act defines an underwriter as:
any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or
112 Id. (citations omitted).
113 First Equity Corp. of Fla., 869 F.2d at 180.
114 Id.
5 "Where the Issuer of a security is engaged in interstate commerce or in a
business affecting interstate commerce, or its securities are traded by the use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of intrastate commerce, and in addition the
issuer has assets exceeding a specified amount and a class of equity security held by
a specified number of persons, registration by filing a statement with the Commis-
sion is required, unless specified exceptions apply." 79A C.J.S. Sec. Reg. § 112
(1995).
16 69 AM. JUR. 2D Sec. Reg. Fed. § 69 n.82 (1993).
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offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution
of any security, or has direct or indirect participation in any
such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the
direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking ....
Thus, as defined in federal securities laws, the term
"underwriter" is significantly broader than the term's common
definition as used in the securities industry.11
Because rating agencies neither buy, purchase, nor sell se-
curities for distribution, whether a rating agency falls within the
definition of a statutory underwriter turns upon the meaning of
the language "participation in the direct or indirect underwrit-
ing." A recent Seventh Circuit decision, Harden v. Raffens-
berger, Hughes & Co.,"' interpreting the statutory definition of
underwriter seems to support the proposition that the rating
agencies involved in the structuring of mortgage-backed securi-
ties are statutory underwriters.
In Harden, the defendant was retained as a "qualified inde-
pendent underwriter" to assist in the preparation of a registra-
tion statement and to recommend the minimum yield rate for
the issuance of twenty million dollars in short term notes." The
defendant, however, was not the actual classic underwriter for
the transaction. 2' The use of a qualified independent under-
writer was essential to the transaction because of certain Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers rules requiring such
participation.12' A class action suit was brought against the de-
fendant as a statutory underwriter for materially misleading
statements in the registration statement in violation of federal
securities laws. Rejecting the defendant's argument that it was
not an underwriter because the defendant neither purchased, of-
fered, nor sold the notes, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit first noted the district court's observations that the de-
fendant's "services were essential" to the distribution of the
notes. "'2 The district court had determined that prior decisions
117 15 U.S.C. § 77b (11) (1994).
"1 79A C.J.S. Sec. Reg. § 71 (1995); 69 AM. JUR. 2D Sec. Reg. Fed. § 69 n.82
(1993).
19 65 F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1995).
12' Id. at 1394-95.
1-" Id.
12, Id. at 1395 (citing NASD Compliance Manual, (CCH) 1882, Sch. E, S 3 (c)(1)
(1994)).
m Id.
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interpreting the definition of underwriter had construed
"participation" broadly to include activities beyond actual finan-
cial participation and concluded that because the defendant's
participation was " 'necessary to and a substantial factor' in the
distribution of the ... notes, [the defendant] 'participated,' at
least indirectly in their distribution."1"
The Court of Appeals essentially followed the district court's
reasoning and further noted that recent Supreme Court prece-
dent "makes clear that ... one who 'participates,' or 'takes part
in,' an underwriting is subject to [underwriter] liability."" The
Court of Appeals also looked to its own precedent which stated
that "the statutory definition [of underwriter, contained in sec-
tion 2(11)] specifically covers every person who participates in a
distribution of securities," 6 and that "the term 'underwriter' is
broad enough to encompass all persons who engage in steps nec-
essary to the distribution of securities."127
The rule for "participant liability" that seems to evolve from
the Harden decision is that when a party actively participates in
the structuring of a securities transaction, and that party's par-
ticipation is essential to the transaction, that party will be
deemed a statutory underwriter, even if the participation falls
short of actual classic underwriting. Notably, what is left unan-
swered by Harden is to what extent a party may actively partici-
pate in a transaction and escape potential underwriter liability
when the participation is not essential to the transaction.
Applying the rule for "participant liability" to rating agen-
cies involved in private label mortgage-backed securitization, it
seems clear that the rating agencies are statutory underwriters
as defined in federal securities laws. By their own admissions,
the rating agencies take an active role in the structuring of these
securities. Furthermore, any transaction relying on SMMEA
mortgage-related security provisions, or any other rating-
dependent rule, makes the rating agencies essential participants
in the transaction. Indeed the notion that statutory underwriter
duties should be imposed upon rating agencies involved in struc-
turing mortgage-backed securities is not all that extraordinary.
Harden, 65 F.3d at 1396 (applying doctrine of participant liability).
Id. at 1400 (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988)).
'2 Id. (quoting SEC v. VanHorn, 371 F.2d 181, 188 (7th Cir. 1966)) (alterations
in original).
'2' Id. (quoting SEC v. Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130, 139 n.13 (7th Cir. 1982)).
1996]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
As one scholar has noted, Standard & Poor's, in its property
specific model for commercial mortgage securitization, essen-
tially "acts as the underwriter for the mortgage loan .... 128
CONCLUSION
Over the course of the twentieth century, the role of the
rating agency has evolved from a completely passive market
participant, entirely detached financially from securities issuers,
to an active market participant, soliciting business directly from
the issuers and essentially dictating the structure of mortgage-
backed securities. Nevertheless, while virtually all other market
participants are regulated to some extent, the rating agencies
remain free from regulation.
Skeptics of the rating agencies suggest that market pressure
may be having an impact on rating agency objectivity and ques-
tion whether regulatory reliance on the rating agencies is justi-
fied. Indeed, there appears to be a correlation between agency
adjustments to rating standards and market share, leading to
the conclusion that some form of regulation is inevitable.
In the interim, however, while courts have interpreted the
common law to impose a very high threshold for liability on the
rating agencies, there appears to be precedent to support the
proposition that the rating agencies involved in the structuring
of mortgage-backed securities should be imposed with statutory
underwriter duties under current federal securities laws. This
result is dictated by the active role that the rating agencies as-
sume when structuring mortgage-backed securities and by the
necessity of rating agency participation due to the various rat-
ing-dependent rules.
The impact of imposing statutory underwriter duties on the
rating agencies is unclear, however, due to the interplay of other
securities laws and doctrines not addressed by this paper. This
notwithstanding, at the very least, it seems that imposing statu-
tory underwriter duties should raise the standard of care from
recklessness to negligence for rating agencies involved in the
structuring of mortgage-backed securities.
Finally, a discussion of the type and extent of regulatory
oversight of the rating agencies that may be necessary has been
beyond the scope of this paper, and indeed, whether it is even
'2 See LORE, supra note 1, at 9-57.
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socially desirable to impose liability upon the rating agencies has
not been examined. Nevertheless, the mere fact that a rating
agency may fit the definition of a statutory underwriter should
serve as a warning that the rating agencies are no longer the
passive market participants that they once were.
Gerard Uzzi

